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item0075E 1058, 1059
1058
January 2005
Abuse of "Contract"
Be
suspicious of any politician who claims to have a "contract" with the
people. For the 17th century John Locke, the grand concept of a
Social Contract served a
particular theoretical purpose. He argued that the authority of
government itself arose from an implied contract between the people and
their sovereign, the Government. The people agreed to obey, the
Sovereign agreed to protect - there was there a certain parity. He
rebelled against the legitimacy of armed conquest, or Divine Right, so he sought a source of political
legitimacy in the peaceable civil concept of contract.
Modern politicians, of both right and
left, abuse this concept. Parents are required to enter into
"contracts" with schools, governing their children's conduct or their own.
Young criminals are required to enter into "contracts", as part of their
probation or their punishment. Drug addicts are constrained to enter
into treatment "contracts". And now Alan Milburn offers a new
"Contract" with the people, as a means of winning a third term in power.
This
is dangerous, authoritarian nonsense.
These are not contracts. They
are acts of coercion, sweetly sugared. The distinctive force of "contract" is that it represents a
consensus between
equals, each with the option to accept or reject its terms. It is
a meeting of minds. If,
given such an option, you accept those terms, the full force of the
law and society will combine to enforce that contract.
But there can
never be a consensual contract between the individual and
the State to whose authority he is subject. These parties are not equals.
The fundamental parity of bargaining power is missing, depriving the
"contract" of any arguable force. The use of term
contract is a devious political deceit.
And Milburn's latest opus is
positively menacing: it
appeared in The Guardian last week, offering contract terms
to the electorate: "If you play by the rules, you get a chance to
progress", says Milburn.
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1059
29
January 2005
Gateway
to Disaster
John
Prescott's plans for a great new city along the Thames will be a disaster.
That is what the great architect Richard Rogers writes in The
Guardian this week, and he is right.
But he is right - for entirely the wrong reasons. He argues that
the whole process should be run by Great Architects - but that would be a
disaster of a new and different kind. Our town-building failures, in
the UK, run very deep, within our system of government, and the
limitations of our political understanding.
Government
has never properly understood either (a) the essence of local, municipal
government or (b) the unique character of the property development industry.
These fault-lines are quite unconnected, but their combination has played a
lethal role in the emergence of our present difficulties. Let me
consider each in turn.
Constitutional, structural factors. Since 1919, the
UK has moved steadily in the direction of London-dominated centralised
nation-state, suffering a long-term decline in the quality of its city, or
municipal, government. Before WW1, the trends were different:
Westminster wanted no part in the drudgeries of local government. But
from 1919 onwards, central Government was drawn more and more closely into
the management of mun1cipal life - with housing provision, highway expansion
with the rise of the motor-car, and finally with town-and-country planning
post WW2. Rising politicians came soon to bypass municipal government,
and aim straight for Westminster.
As a society, we simply lost our focus upon the growth and development of
cities. Continental and US city authorities remained powerful players
upon their national stages, and many of them enjoy the fruits of that
retained status. In the UK, municipal government simply disappeared
from political sight after WW2, increasingly the unimportant creature of the
Westminster/Whitehall political machine. After all, every municipal
"Development Plan" had to be confirmed by central Government before it could
come into force! It was in this period (say, 1910/2000) that
our city-building skills were lost.
If
our great cities had been in the care of powerful municipal authorities
throughout this period, the present shortcomings (in terms of commuting
systems, supplies of residential development land) would not have
arisen. For these are the meat-and-drink of municipal politics, and
their management demands intimate knowledge of local city systems. It
is central Government, faced with impossible task of managing 35-or-so city
systems, which got it wrong. And Scottish and Welsh devolution offers
no solution: the invisibility of Edinburgh and Glasgow, of Cardiff and
Swansea, in the devolution scheme is another tell-tale sign of the awful
short-sightedness that has developed. We have simply lost the skills
of city development and government, in wave upon wave of
over-centralisation.
The second failing is one of commercial ignorance.
The UK has a residential development industry that is unique in Europe; it
has many parallels in the US, but not on the Continent. From 1900
onwards, boosted by the remarkable success of the building society movement,
there developed in the UK a distinctive residential development industry -
which became the powerhouse of urban growth for the 20th century.
A
residential development industry is much more than a house building
industry. The "construction" industry has little in common with the
development industry. Construction companies are practised at building
to order, manufacturing against plan, and being paid solely for the
manufacturing process. The the business of the "developer" is quite
different: he must organise the provision of suitable land, decide what
houses to build, get planning permission and arrange for their design and
construction - and he will ordinarily not be paid at (except for a 10%
deposit) until the whole process is complete. To different these
functions, the developer was sometimes known as a "speculative housebuilder"
or spec-builder, although in this sense every car-manufacturer is a spec
car-builder...
The developer must focus on the saleability, and
the value of the completed items of real property
(site/environment/accommodation) which he creates. And he must
ensure that his total selling-price is sufficient to cover all the costs of
his protracted project. "Construction" is a low-risk, low-profit
industry: "property development" (both residential and commercial) is
a high-risk, high-profit business.
The problem is that Government (both civil servants and politicians)
is deeply ignorant of the requirements and dynamics of the property
development industry. That is why poor John Prescott continues to
flounder, with successive duff ideas in the housing field.
"Construction" is well understood within Government, and among civil
servants, and links with the construction industry are well-resourced.
But the "developer" is regarded as a suspect figure, parasitic upon the body
politic.
I
should know. As a housebuilder, in the 1974/77 period, I was
Industrial Adviser on Construction to the then Labour
Government. Working under the great Tony Crosland, it was my job to
keep the Department of the Environment informed about the state of "private
house-building" (another tell-tale term...) My Civil Service
colleagues, lacking any commercial experience, simply did not grasp the
nature of business systems upon which their actions impacted. During
my two years, I did my best to explain, from my position as Under-Secretary,
and I certainly had a positive impact upon the configuration of the great
Development Land Tax Act. But it was ultimately to no avail.
There was no change in the permanent advisory structure, there was no
development of relevant expertise in the ways of the residential development
industry. After I left, the waters closed over my desk.
And
to this day, Government flounders - in getting to grips with maintaining
production rates in the housing market. The industry itself is poorly
organised, with a very ineffective "Housebuilders Federation" which has
never escaped the ambiguities of its title, and is fearful of attracting
political and social unpopularity. Labour politicians have proved
entirely impervious to any outside influence, even from the likes of me who
are on their side. Their Civil Service advisers remain ill-informed.
And Labour politicians still retain a glowering suspicion of the "spec
house-builder" as a spiv and a conman, with whom they should never do
business. There is no communication going on.
That is why Labour's housing policy in in such disarray, panicking with
huge land-releases, instead of being able to rely on the ordinary local
processes of urban development, regressing to post-WW1 "prefabs" in an
initiative which is bound to fail.
What do you think? Drop me a
line
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