The Case for a new Local Democratic Order

by Roger Warren Evans  1996

part of "Building a New Britain"
an alternative approach to devolution and local governance. 
Published by the City Region Campaign                                                 Page 6

Pages One - Two - Three - Four - Five - Six - Seven

Creating new Provinces

Finally, our solution also encompasses the case for provincial (or large-regional) government, as well as the national aspirations of Scotland and Wales, the special case of Northern Ireland, and wider regional interests where they commanded popular support within England.  The terminology of this constitutional debate can be misleading, for although the 1960s Redcliffe-Maud Commission referred to such large-regions as "provinces", that usage has not subsisted.  We suggest that Parliament should incorporate into the paving legislation a clearly-defined formula for "Provincial delegation" which would be accessible to combinations of regions, where the entire provincial electorate had had the opportunity of voting by local referendum.

Avoid big-ban federalism, choose gradual transition

Political analysts and politicians are increasingly expressing concerns about the once-for-all creation of a "federal" constitution dividing Scotland from England, inconsistent with the unitary principles of the unwritten UK Constitution, and about the resultant creation of parallel and competing legislatures.  There is predictable apprehension that the process would weaken the UK State in unforeseen ways.  Our formula avoids that risk.  With this alternative model, Parliament would develop over the years the practice of differentiating between "national mandatory norms" (to which no Provincial amendment would be constitutionally permitted), and other provisions, which any Provincial legislature would be entitled to amend, in their application to its province.  The Province would have to meet any additional costs of such amending legislation from its own resources. 

This solution would lack the political appeal of an initial "declaration" of the provincial legislative jurisdiction, and we acknowledge that Scottish interests would initially be disappointed by it.  But such problems would be mitigated if Parliament were to include in the paving legislation an initial schedule of "amendable legislation", thus enabling Provincial Assemblies to proceed to legislate immediately in certain spheres.  The countervailing advantage would be that the process of constitutionl change would be more gradual, more robust, more acceptable to the widest possible cross-section of the nation, and ness likely to be reversed by Westminster.

Parliament to regulate provincial referenda

Once the new basic regional building-blocks were in place, it would be open to groups of contiguous regions to combine to drawn down the powers of a "Province".  The regional authorities would seek the consent of Parliament to proceed to a provincial referendum, for such area as Parliament might approve, under procedures set out in the paving legislation.  Popular voting would be by way of a single provincial vote, not region-by-region.  A parallel is to be found in the Victorian practice of offering local communities the right to adopt packages of rights and powers, if organised themselves to manage local affairs.

The Provincial Delegation

If the provincial electorate voted to create a Province, and a provincial assembly, that vote would have the following consequences, all of which would be spelt out in the paving legislation -

• A Provincial Assembly would be formed, consisting of all the elected Regional Assembly members, sitting as a provincial assembly commanding its own administrative staff.  For Scotland and Wales, the net result would therefore be numerically the same as for Labour's current proposals (i.e. one or two Assembly representatives for each Parliamentary constituency) but the Members would come to the Provincial Assembly by way of dual electoral mandate, and would combine both representative functions.  the French Constitution demonstrates the advantages of dual mandates (albeit in a slightly different form) in securing effective integration between different authorities;
• The Provincial Assembly would be entitled to amend Westminster legislation, within limits set out by statute, in its application to the Province; there would be no right to initiate new legislation, outside the scope of Westminster legislation.  This constrained amending jurisdiction would offer an alternative to the creation of a "federal" constitution, with open-ended provincial originating powers, which remains inconsistent both with UK tradition and the underlying principles of the UK legislative process;
• The Province would be entitled to receive supplementary Westminster grant to meet its basic establishment and administrative costs, without having to rely on Regional contributions; but otherwise it would receive only such additional grant as Westminster might from time to time determine;
• The Provincial Assembly would have certain defined tax-raising powers (i.e. the right to precept the Regional Assemblies, which would remain the tax-collection authorities) appropriate to the discharge of its functions, but they would not displace the fiscal jurisdiction of the regional authorities themselves;
• The Provincial Assembly would be entitled to take over, from the Government Regional Offices, certain jurisdictions (to be identified specifically by schedule in the paving legislation), and the budgets for such functions would also be transferred; this change would not have the effect, however, of transferring to the Province the right to modify Westminster Government grants made directly to the Regional Assemblies;
• The Provincial Assembly would be entitled to assume functions of external representation outside the UK, both in the field of economic development and trade negotiations and otherwise; this would be the subject of a majority vote in the Provincial Assembly, but each Region should however, retain a qualified veto in the form of a one-year delaying power, as deployed in the UK Parliament, in the relationship between the Lords and the Commons;
• The Provincial Assembly would be entitled to proceed similarly with policy integration in any sphere of regional government, by way of the same procedure;
• The Provincial Assembly would be entitled to proceed with political responsibility for those quangos operating on a Province-wide basis, sharing nomination rights with the Westminster Government, and exercising appropriate oversight.  It is envisaged that in respect of certain quango functions, the Provincial Assembly would be entitled to call for their transfer to itself, eliminating altogether the governing-body of the quango concerned.

Thus the formation of a "Province" would represent the alternative disposition of government resources already for the most part deployed.  Some functions would be transferred from UK Regional Offices, others would be assigned or transferred to it by its component regions.  Provincial government would represent an extension of the self-governing powers of the regions: the dual mandate would have the effect of avoiding any sense of distance between the two authorities, and would maximise integration between them.  It would reflect the redeployment, by the provincial electorate, of the governmental resources at their disposal, with the addition of further resources to be generated legitimately by the Provincial Assembly itself, and a limited additional UK grant component.

• OMITTED: Detailed suggestions for the conduct of Provincial referenda, also Northern Ireland - for supplementary material drop me a line.

And finally, the overall national and global context >>  More