You are in the company of 
Roger Warren Evans
   


  Part of   www.LivePolitics.net                                 < Back to Home Page  
 
New
Living Diary
Index


New  participatory democracy

Taming the Corporations

My Welsh socialism

My New Socialist Settlement

Globalise the left!

Bevan  re-visited


RWE Biography

 

   

item0052A  820, 821

820   23 September 2003   

Wanted! 
New Model of the UK

What is your "model" of the UK?  How do you configure your own "nation state", in your mind? In business, one talks about a "business model", as a means of describing how a trading system operates, or is planned to operate - the language comes from psychology, more particularly epistemology ("the theory of knowledge").

Government actions such as the recent threat to limit LA taxation presuppose a model - of the economy, the polity and the society - which subtly informs all political thinking.  It is vital that that model is "correct" - otherwise, the wrong policy conclusions will flow.  We should debate that model, openly.

  • Let me try to state the propositions which underlie my own “model”, just to show what I mean.  The imaginative process is not an easy one.

My model is first-and-foremost a unitary one – the UK economy is “The Greater London economy”.  Every part is related to every other, in some way.  And I include Scotland in that model, although I can imagine the future emergence of a freestanding “Scottish economy” in the event of political independence.  And Northern Ireland is – it seems to me – a separate, ailing colonial economy, heavily dependent on life-support from Greater London.

My model is unitary for two reasons - one general, one particular.  

·         Generally, the modern welfare state has generalised the redistribution of purchasing power: the boundaries and contents of each welfare state has come to define the “economy” of a territory.  Sweden’s rejection of the Euro, led as it was by conventional leftwing elements within the country, was strongly conditioned by worries about the Swedish “welfare state” – the economy and the benefits system has become, as a matter of modern politics, closely intertwined.  Some of the rigidities of the French, Italian and German systems are attributable to the confluence of these two elements.  The common availability of welfare benefits from the Gorbals to Greenwich, and from Sunderland to Swansea, demarcates the unitary modern UK economy.

·         More particularly, the glittering success of London as a world city region puts the rest of the UK economy into the shade.  The HQ functions of every major economic sector are to be found in London.  This week, I shall be spending two separate days working in London – travelling 200 miles by rail each morning and 200 miles back in the evening – commuting from Swansea to London.  The InterCity service between Swansea and London is, properly understood, a feeder/commuter service for London. 

·         The economic and political dominance of London explains the reluctance of “national” Governments to cede power to any democratic London Authority.  London’s boundaries are strictly contained, and there is no talk of devolving to Londoners the powers already extended, for example, to the Welsh.  A Cabinet Minister is deciding future London airport strategy, as well as London rail investment and Tube privatisation, another Cabinet Minister manages the release of housing-land to accommodate the growth of the city region – yet another is “Minister for London”…  London is a mega-market, a brilliant, sparkling, multi-cultural international city, a magnet of modern civilisation – a stimulus to all the UK economies, as well as that of Ireland.

It follows that I advocate the central determination, by the UK Government, of all the key “regulators” of the economy – trade taxation, company law, competition regulation, employment law – my model presupposes a unitary regulatory “trading space” – not just for “businesses” (i.e. private-profit-driven traders) but public service traders (whose incidence I see increasing in future).  Trade is trade, for whatever motive it is prosecuted.  Policy consequences flow from this model: for example, I would not allow state subsidies to be used by provincial governments to attract footloose industry, while I would retain that option for the UK Government.

My model is thus a unitary one, in all principal matters of
(a) trade and (b) welfare.  These are peculiarly functions of the UK State.  In making its principal “welfare promises” to all its citizens, a state should put the full weight of its credit behind each promise – in education, medical care, sickness and unemployment benefits, pensions.  Indeed, for the modern world, those welfare promises constitute the primary pillars of statehood.

It sounds, does it not, as if I am an unreformed Old Left “centraliser”?  Whitehall knows best?    Nothing could be further from the truth.  For apart from the further matters of war, peace and international diplomacy, I believe that far-reaching devolution is possible and desirable in most other aspects of our daily lives.  I fully share the aspirations of the Blair Cabinet’s “new localism”, although I am sceptical about the depth of their understanding of the issues.  

Federal is good  I consider that a federal provincial model akin to those or Germany or Spain, suitably designed for UK circumstances, would work extremely well – indeed, the essential sinews of the appropriate model are to be seen at work, in Wales.  My full reasoning is set out at Building a Better Britain .  And I would wish to see executive devolution taken much further still, to all our great city regions – Newcastle, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Bradford, Nottingham, Norwich, Plymouth. Bournemouth, Southampton – with no doubt much lively debate over the final list, within each Province.  Provincial devolution (to our “big regions”) is entirely compatible with the re-launching of our great cities, although the process must be structured far more skilfully than in the case of either Scots or Welsh devolution.

As for tax-income, I consider that we already have a satisfactory solution in the device of the “Block (Provincial) Grant” – as developed for both Scotland and Wales.  That device should be refined, and should represent a growing proportion of public expenditure.  Provincial Assemblies should have the right to deploy resources as they wished within the constraints of the Block Grant, subject to any overriding UK-national considerations.  By way of provincial/local taxation, I would repatriate business rating to local communities, and rely on the potential of property taxes alone, albeit now limited.  In a unitary state, such taxes should play only a minor part in the financial calculations of citizens and businesses.

Given a unitary trading and benefit “space”, our lives would be immeasurably enriched if we could create for ourselves, throughout England, the wider range of systemic options which devolution offers.  Once a decent devolution package was on offer (and it is not, at the moment), each Provincial electorate should be given the option (as under the present Regional Assemblies Bill) of voting to create an Assembly, or to continue with “direct rule” from Westminster.

  • That's my mental model - what's yours?

Drop me a line

 < Back to Home Page


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


821  24 September 2003  

Is it a bird?  Is it a loan?  Is it a Pertax?

Warning!  I think I may do a U-turn, on U-Top-up Fees! 

I favour, you may recall, a Graduate Tax, levied on all future graduates, by way of percentage premium on their primary income-tax liability.  That was Charles Clarke’s initial preference.  I have always been content with the principle that graduates should fund additional university funding requirements, rather than draw down upon general taxation.  I simply threw in, for good measure, a bit of wealth redistribution, by levying the tax on all graduates, including graduates from wealthier families who did not need public funding in the first place.

But as I come to understand more of the Charles Clarke Top-Up Fee compromise, it looks less like a loan and the more like a tax anyway - albeit with the redistribution removed.   Not a universal tax, but a tax nevertheless.  Indeed, I suspect we are seeing the emergence of a wholly new form of tax – a “smart tax” which uses the tax-collection mechanism to recover from moneys that the State has laid out specifically on that individual taxpayer.  

  • I have called it a Pertax.   If I am right, the implications could be very far-reaching indeed.

The Pertax would seem to be a wholly-new fiscal instrument.  The State makes a specific outlay, for the benefit of a particular person, and is entitled to recoup the money only in certain circumstances.   Any student may use these Pertax facilities – not only those whose families cannot afford to pay outright.  This is not a conventional “loan” arrangement, for a borrower lacking other ways to pay – it is potentially something far grander.  It is potentially an alternative way of funding certain public service themselves.

Unlike a loan, with a Pertax there is no outright obligation to “repay”.   From the student who drops out or flunks the exams’ the State will not be entitled to recoup any part of its outlay.  The liability to pay this Pertax will be triggered only by the achievement of a graduate qualification of some kind.  And then earning more than a minimum trigger income.

While the sums laid out by the State will be indexed to the Retail Price Index, they will not carry any additional interest – thus the State will be entitled to recover only a sum equivalent to the value of the moneys originally laid out, adjusted for inflation. This has been described as the proposition that the sums “carry no real interest”, which I take to be a restatement of the same point.

If a graduate chooses a low-income life-style, and never earns more than £15,000 pa at present values, the State will never be able to levy the Pertax at all.  The impecunious graduate cannot be made to “repay” in any other way.   Again, this bears none of the hallmarks of a conventional loan.

If the graduate continues for the whole of life in low-income employment (albeit in excess of £15,000 pa) and yet retires or dies without completing the “repayment”, the State will not be able to recover the balance against his estate, however wealthy he may turn out to be in death – again, unlike a loan.

I have not worked out what happens if the graduate emigrates, and lives a life outside the UK Income Tax regime – can a tax be levied in any other way, on “foreign” income?  Has any reader of this Website sussed that out?

If it works, the Pertax would constitute a powerful new fiscal instrument.  Effectively, the State would be acting as a special form of financier, funding the individual’s requirements on very favourable terms, while using the mandatory mechanisms of “tax” to recoup its outlay.  The formal mechanism of “tax collection” would be used for an entirely novel purpose.  The terms of the transaction are attractive - low-interest, with repayment deferred potentially over 30/40 years – coupled with the contractual extinction of any obligation to repay if the “borrower” cannot afford it.  As an alternative to conventional borrowing, this form of transaction would have much to commend it, even for those who could afford to borrow in the ordinary commercial market.

If that is right, consider the other possible applications of this device.  If “Top-Up Fees”, why not all tuition fees?  Why not maintenance, living costs?  Why should students not be allowed to draw down “maintenance moneys”, to avoid excessive work commitments during periods of study?  Why should the scheme not be applied to mature students, and the “late” acquisition of qualifications?  And turning to the NHS, why should medical operations and treatments not be “sold” to those requiring them, on similar deferred terms?

Have I got this analysis right?   Is the Pertax a stalking-horse for a new form of “State credit financing” – asking individuals to assume personal responsibility for funding their own “big-lump” expenditure?  Would the State not be going into competition with the private-banking system?  Such a system would have certain drawbacks, because it would necessarily “make a loss” – simply because there is no profit-factor built into its calculations.  But the net effect (having accounted for the loss) would be to relieve the State Purse of obligations that would be all the higher without the Pertax recoupment process.

  • We’ve had smart bombs.  We’ve had personalised missiles, targeting individual vehicles.  We could now have smart taxes.

What do you think?  Drop me a line

 < Back to Home Page

 

 
 
 
 
   

Created by GMID Design & Communication

COPYRIGHT NOTICE
The originating content of this website is my own work, and subject to my copyright. But on one condition only, I hereby give my consent to its unrestricted reproduction for any purpose: the condition is that its source is subject to proper acknowledgment, giving my name, my assertion of copyright, and the name of this website as its source, namely: www.warrenevans.net
- is that a deal?  Roger WE